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SOUTH CAROLINA EMPLOYERS'
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY TO AT-
WILL EMPLOYEES: THE PRESENT
STATE AND FUTURE COURSE OF THE
SMALL CAUSE OF ACTION
In 1987 the South Carolina Supreme Court announced in Small v.
Springs Industries, Inc.' (Small I) that employers' policies and repre-
sentations are admissible to determine whether the employer and em-
ployee modified an employment-at-will contract. Since that time the
extent to which contract law will impose liability on employers remains
uncertain. Although other jurisdictions have addressed the issues that
Small I left unanswered, those cases often reached different results
and employed different methods of analysis.2 This Note will analyze
Small I and subsequent South Carolina cases to determine the current
scope of an employer's liability under a contractual analysis. This Note
will then draw upon views of commentators and cases from other juris-
dictions to examine other contractual theories of liability that may be
available in South Carolina.
1. EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DocTRINE
The employment-at-will doctrine is based on the common-law rule
of employment followed in most American jurisdictions. "[T]he rule is
inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at
will . .1.3 The presumption created by the rule is that the relation-
ship may be terminated by either party, at any time, for any reason.4
South Carolina formally recognized the employment-at-will doctrine in
1936.
5
1. 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987). The court addressed damages issues in the
case three years after the original decision. See Small v. Springs Indus., Inc., 300 S.C.
481, 388 S.E.2d 808 (1990).
2. The questions that Small left unanswered are addressed in Parts III-VI. Part
VII deals with causes of action that would require an expansion of Small.
3. HENRY H. PERRIrr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.4, at 9 (2d
ed. 1987) (quoting HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
§ 134, at 272 (1877)).
4. For a comprehensive discussion on the doctrine and its erosion, see PERRITr,
supra note 3, §§ 1.1-.17.
5. Shealy v. Fowler, 182 S.C. 81, 188 S.E. 499 (1936); see Ludwick v. This Minute
1
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Employees who seek damages arising out of the employee's dis-
charge from an employer may defeat their at-will status in two ways:
The employee may rely on judicially-created exceptions to the at-will
doctrine, or the employee may rebut the at-will presumption and hold
the employer liable for breach of contract. The California Court of Ap-
peals was the first court to recognize an exception to the employment-
at-will doctrine. In Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters6 the court recognized a cause of action in tort for wrongful dis-
charge as an exception to the at-will rule.7 The employer discharged
the plaintiff for failure to commit perjury before a state legislative
committee. The Petermann court reasoned that, under the facts of the
case, the public policy interest in prohibiting perjury could be fur-
thered only by limiting the employer's absolute right to terminate an
employee." The Petermann court created the first exception to the at-
will doctrine: the public policy exception.
South Carolina first recognized the public policy exception to the
at-will doctrine in Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc.10 The em-
ployer in Ludwick discharged the plaintiff for honoring the subpoena
of a state administrative board. The South Carolina Supreme Court
recognized the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
and allowed the plaintiff to recover damages.-'
In contrast to the public policy exception cases, other cases have
addressed the at-will presumption of the employment-at-will doctrine
and found the employer liable in contract. These cases protect the em-
ployee without creating an exception to the at-will doctrine. Courts
that use this analysis describe the employment-at-will doctrine as a
presumption that can be rebutted by sufficient evidence.1
2
The Alabama Supreme Court used this analysis in Hoffman-La
Roche, Inc. v. Campbell." In Campbell the court allowed a pharma-
ceutical sales representative to recover damages from his employer be-
cause his discharge violated the provisions of an employee handbook.
The court looked to contract law to determine the effect of the at-will
of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 222, 337 S.E,2d 213, 214 (1985) (listing cases that follow
Shealy).
6. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
7. See id. at 28.
8. Id. at 27.
9. See id.
10. 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985).
11. Id. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216.
12. See Thompson v. American Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409, 416 (W.D. Va.
1985) (mem.) (finding that the employment-at-will doctrine is a rebuttable presump-
tion); Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 547 A.2d 260, 267 (N.H. 1988) (finding that
employment is prima facie at will).
13. 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987).
[Vol. 43
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doctrine on the employee's claim. The Campbell court stated:
The Court continues to adhere to the [employment-at-will doc-
trine]. Indeed, in this case, we are not asked to abrogate the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. We are asked only to determine what effect cer-
tain provisions set out in an employee handbook had upon the
employer's right to exercise its powers to terminate the employment
relationship at will.
1 4
Under this analysis the court found that the employee's discharge vio-
lated his employment contract. 15
Liability in contract under the rebuttable presumption analysis is
not limited to "handbook liability." Courts consider a variety of com-
munications including oral representations, promulgated policies, and
application forms.16 Courts may even interpret the terms of the rela-
tionship in light of subjective evidence such as the employee's reasona-
ble expectations. 7 Although Small I clearly applies to express contract
terms,'8 it is unsettled in South Carolina whether subjective evidence
of an employee's expectations is admissible to rebut the presumption
of an at-will relationship.
II. THE SMALL I DECISION AND ITS INTERPRETATIONS
Kathy Small was employed at Springs Industries for five years
when the company issued a handbook and bulletin to its employees.
These documents set forth in detail the company's procedure for em-
14. Id. at 728.
15. Id. at 738.
16. E.g., Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (N.Y. 1982). The cases
that address contractual liability have construed many forms of employer-employee com-
munications. In addition to promulgated handbooks and policy statements, the list in-
cludes pre-employment negotiations, offer letters, orientation materials, and oral repre-
sentations. See Forman v. BRI Corp., 532 F. Supp. 49 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (mem.) (denying
summary judgment to the employer on the basis of oral pre-employment negotiations);
Loffa v. Intel Corp., 738 P.2d 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (affirming the trial court's dam-
ages award on the basis of employee orientation materials); Gatins v. NCR Corp., 349
S.E.2d 818 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming grant of summary judgment to the employer
against employees who attempted to use offer letters as the basis of an employment con-
tract); Sorenson v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70 (Idaho 1990) (affirming grant of sum-
mary judgment to the employer when the employee sought to establish a contract on the
basis of an oral offer to transfer); Terrio v. Millinocket Comm. Hosp., 379 A.2d 135 (Me.
1977) (denying the employer's appeal of a jury award to the employee based solely on the
employer's written personnel policy).
17. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980);
Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J.), modified, 499 A.2d 515
(N.J. 1985).
18. See Small I, 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452 (1987).
19921
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ployment termination. They described a four-step process that con-
sisted of a verbal reprimand, a written warning, a final written warn-
ing, and finally a discharge. In addition to the handbook and bulletin,
Small's supervisors orally assured the employees that the four-step
procedure would be uniformly applied. NevertheleSs, Springs dis-
charged Small after one written warning. The South Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed the jury's finding that Springs had breached the hand-
book policy. The court held that "a jury can consider an employee
handbook, along with other evidence, in deciding whether the employer
and employee had a limiting agreement on the employee's at-will em-
ployment status." 19
Two points of view exist on the impact of Small I. The first point
of view is that Small I creates a new right to recover despite the em-
ployment-at-will doctrine,20 or that it greatly expands liability under
the existing cause of action for breach of contract. 21 Although neither
Small I nor authority from other jurisdictions would support the state-
ment that the decision creates a new cause of action or an exception-to
the at-will doctrine,22 it is difficult to contest the position that the deci-
sion greatly extends contractual liability.
23
The second view of Small I, which commands a slight majority of
the court, is that the case did not create a new cause of action. Instead,
Small I merely "allowed the introduction of... handbooks as evi-
dence of a contract" in a breach of contract action.24 By adopting the
second view of Small I, the South Carolina Supreme Court in Toth v.
Square D Co. 25 clarified that a Small I action is a breach of contract
19. Id. at 486, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
20. Toth v. Square D Co., 298 S.C. 6, 11, 377 S.E.2d 584, 587 (1989) (per curiam)
(Gregory, C.J., dissenting); see id. at 12, 377 S.E.2d at 587 (Finney, J., dissenting); see
also Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 116 & n.12 (Mich. 1989) (stat-
ing that Small I "recognize[s] some type of 'handbook exception' to the employment-at-
will doctrine"); see generally Matthew J. Norton, Annual Survey of South Carolina
Law, Implied Contract Exception to Employment at Will Doctrine Applied Retroac-
tively, 42 S.C. L. REV. 133 (1990).
21. Toth, 298 S.C. at 12, 377 S.E.2d at 587-88 (Finney, J., dissenting).
22. Cf. Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 225, 337 S.E.2d 213,
216 (1985) ("Where the retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee constitutes violation
of a clear mandate of public policy, a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge
arises.").
23. See Adams v. Square D Co., 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1364, 1366 (D.S.C.
1991) ("The South Carolina Supreme Court changed . . . employment law . . .with
Small.").
24. Toth, 298 S.C. at 9, 377 S.E.2d at 586; accord Blankenship v. South Carolina
Elec. & Gas Co., 5 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 930, 932 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Richland 1990)
("The holding in Small, therefore, does not abrogate the doctrine of employment at will
in South Carolina.").
25. 298 S.C. 6, 377 S.E.2d 584 (1989) (per curiasm). Justice Finney and Chief Jus-
[Vol. 43
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol43/iss2/6
CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
action.26 Therefore, Small I fits into the category of cases in which evi-
dence is admitted to rebut the prima facie at-will status of the
employee.
HI. CONSTRUCTION OF APPLICABLE CONTRACT LAW
It is well established that employment contracts are unilateral
contracts.2 7 "A contract is unilateral when one party who makes a
promise has received a consideration other than a promise to make the
contract binding. A unilateral contract is also. . . one in which there is
a promise on one side only, the consideration therefor being an act...
,"28 In bilateral contracts "there are promises on the part of both par-
ties to the contract [that are] mutual promises to do some future act in
which the consideration of the promise of one party is a promise on the
part of the other. '29 The promise in a bilateral contract is binding
when the reciprocating promise is made, not when both promises are
performed.30 The promise in a unilateral contract is not binding until
performance begins3 l; therefore, an employer's offer becomes binding
when the offeree accepts and begins performing the duties set by the
employer.
Two views exist on how courts may find the existence of an offer
and define its scope. One view is that an employer's promises may be
gleaned from either express oral or written statements, or from the em-
ployee's legitimate expectations. 32 The second and narrower approach
is that the parties' intentions must be determined from their outward
manifestations.3 3 South Carolina adheres to the outward manifesta-
tice Gregory wrote separate dissenting opinions.
26. Id. at 9, 377 S.E.2d at 586.
27. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 900 (Mich. 1980)
(Ryan, J., concurring); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn.
1983); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1267 (N.J.), modified, 499
A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Small I, 292 S.C. 481, 484, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987).
28. 17A Am. JuR. 2D Contracts § 5, at 27-28 (1991) (footnote omitted).
29. 17A id. at 28. The unilateral framework eliminates the requirement of mutual-
ity of obligation. The South Carolina rule is consistent with the majority rule: mutuality
is not required in employment contracts. See Small I, 292 S.C. at 484-85, 357 S.E.2d at
454; see also Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 885; Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d
441, 444 (N.Y. 1982); Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192, 1194 (Pa. Super. Ct.),
allocatur denied, 536 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 1987). As one commentator pointed out, a require-
ment of mutuality would bind employees as well as employers to the contractual terms.
See PERRITr, supra note 3, § 4.13, at 201.
30. See 17A Am. JUR. 2D Contracts § 5 (1991).
31. See 17A id.
32. See cases cited in supra note 17.
33. E.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Minn. 1983) (cit-
ing Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 117 N.W.2d 213, 221 (Minn. 1962)). However, the gap
1992]
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tions approach. 4 Under this approach courts may admit all oral or
written outward manifestations to prove the existence and scope of an
offer. 5 The Small I court rejected the reasonable expectations theory.
The court objected, however, to the notion that an employer could
"couch a handbook, bulletin or other similar material in mandatory
terms and then .. . ignore these very policies as 'a gratuitous, non-
binding statement of general policy' whenever it works to [the em-
ployer's] disadvantage."
36
Under the outward manifestations approach, courts must address
two issues. First, how may the terms of the offer be couched? Second,
where is the line between a mandatory term and a gratuitous and non-
binding statement of general policy?
The employer must publish the offer to the employee.3 7 The terms
also must be definite or specific enough for a court to enforce.38 Al-
though the Small I court warned employers not to state their policies
in mandatory terms and then treat them as "'gratuitous, nonbinding
statement[s] of general policy,' ,39 South Carolina cases provide little
guidance on what constitutes a mandatory term, as opposed to gratui-
tous policy, speculation, hype, or "statements of wishes, hopes, or
desires.'
0
between the reasonable expectations theory and the outward manifestations theory is
narrowing in practice. In an effort to contain the reasonable expectations theory, the
Michigan Supreme Court, which first promulgated the theory, declared that "whether
employee expectations are legitimate is a question of law for the court." Dumas v. Auto
Club Ins. Ass'n, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1249, 1251 n.4 (Mich. 1991) (plurality)
(citing Bullock v. Automobile Club, 444 N.W.2d 114, 128-29 (Mich. 1989) (Levin, J., sep-
arate opinion), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990)). This development is significant be-
cause it may signal the emergence of the outward manifestations approach as the pre-
dominant theory. This could foreclose the possibility that subjective evidence is
admissible. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
34. See Small I, 292 S.C. 481, 486, 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1987). But cf. Allan v.
Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453, 1456 (S.C. Ct. C.P.
Dorchester 1989) (noting that Small I is based upon Toussaint, which employs a reason-
able expectations theory).
35. See Small 1, 292 S.C. at 483, 357 S.E.2d at 454.
36. Id. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 455 (emphasis added).
37. See Bethea v. Levi Strauss & Co., 827 F.2d 355, 360 n.3 (8th Cir. 1987) (af-
firming summary judgment for the employer because the employer did not distribute the
company policy to its employees). This does not mean that the publication must be in
writing. Publication is defined as "[a]n advising ... a making known of something...
for a lurpose. It implies the means of conveying knowledge or notice." BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY 1227 (6th ed. 1990).
38. McLaurin v. Hamer, 165 S.C. 411, 420, 164 S.E. 2, 5 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1979); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 2-9, at 53 (3d ed. 1987).
39. Small I, 292 S.C at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
40. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 38, § 2-6(c), at 35 (citing Bowman v. Hill, 262
[Vol. 43
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Courts must be sensitive to the reality that employers often make
positive representations of company practices and philosophies, usually
with neither the intent to bind themselves nor to act in an illusory
fashion. Many courts recognize a distinction between speculation or
hype and an offer or promise. A mere statement of policy, philosophy,
or expectation is usually insufficient to constitute an offer or promise.
4 1
Courts have held that assurances of certain treatment in disciplinary
matters, such as vague statements that employees will be treated in a
"fair, just and equitable manner,"' 2 or that there will be a standard of
"'fair play and just and equitable dealings,' ,,43 are too general or
vague to constitute a just cause standard for discharge. Another court
has similarly held unenforceable an assurance that efforts "'should be
made' to accommodate employees with more than 15 years seniority
prior to their discharge" because the assurance lacked specificity."
However, other factors of the employment relationship may give
substance to an otherwise vague policy statement. For example, the Ar-
izona Court of Appeals has held that, in the context of a union avoid-
ance program in which the employer often attempted to make employ-
ees feel they had the security provided by a collective bargaining
agreement, a greater inference arises that there is substance to a state-
ment in a policy manual.4
5
Some courts have stated that an employer should not escape lia-
bility merely because its policies are vague. In Woolley v. Hoffmann-
La Roche, Inc.,46 for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated
that the employer should not profit by avoiding enforcement after
S.E.2d 376 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 15
(1963)). Part of the confusion stems from the fact that both Small I and Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980), the primary case on which the
Small I court relied, involved express representations that conferred specific rights. See
Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453 (S.C. Ct.
C.P. Dorchester 1989). For an interesting example in which vague promises were non-
binding in the absence of any written provision or disclaimer, see Reitmeier v. Converse
College, 7 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 137 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1991).
41. Hillsman v. Sutter Community Hosps., 200 Cal. Rptr. 605, 609 (Ct. App. 1984);
MacGill v. Blue Cross of Maryland, Inc., 551 A.2d 501, 503-04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert.
denied, 556 A.2d 673 (Md. 1989); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626
(Minn. 1983).
42. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Wash. 1984) (en banc).
43. Bauer v. American Freight Sys. Inc., 422 N.W.2d 435, 438 (S.D. 1988) (quoting
personnel handbook).
44. Poklitar v. CBS, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 1023, 1029-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
45. Jeski v. American Express Co., 708 P.2d 110, 111 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (holding
that the question of whether the employment-at-will relationship was altered was a ques-
tion for the trier of fact and summary judgment was therefore inappropriate).
46. 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J.), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985).
1992]
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promulgating the policy. 47 This rationale is consistent with the rule
that because "the language of the instrument is the employer's, the
court must construe it, if its meaning is ambiguous, against the
drafter."'
48
Because Small I involved a clear statement, the approach that the
South Carolina courts will take in defining the existence and terms of
an offer when there is no clear statement by the employer remains an
open question. These issues are fact-specific and will necessarily be re-
solved on a case-by-case basis. As a guide, courts should consider all of
the surrounding circumstances including context, intent, and material-
ity of the alleged term.49 The appropriate standard in contract law is
reasonable certainty.50 The terms usually need not be detailed. 51
Once an employer has made a offer, acceptance by the offeree
must be established. Two primary issues arise when establishing ac-
ceptance. First, does the offeree need to know the content or substance
of each term of employment in order to accept it? Second, what actions
or inactions on the part of the offeree constitute acceptance?
Under the majority view an employee does not need to know all
terms or conditions of employment in order to enforce them against
the employer.52 In many cases the employee is unaware of the terms or
conditions when accepting the offer of employment or when the provi-
sion becomes effective as to that employee.8 3 Under either an estoppel
or contract theory no requirement exists that the employee show
knowledge of the policy at the time it becomes effective. One rationale
for not requiring knowledge is that it would result in inequities be-
tween those employees who are aware of the policy and those who are
47. Id. at 1269 ("If there is a problem arising from indefiniteness, in any event, it is
one caused by the employer."); see Panto v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 547 A.2d 260,
268 (N.H. 1988).
48. Moody v. McLellan, 295 S.C. 157, 160, 367 S.E.2d 449, 451 (Ct. App. 1988)
(citing Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Way, 263 S.C. 101, 208 S.E.2d 31 (1974)).
49. See Laseter v. Pet Dairy Prods. Co., 246 F.2d 747 (4th Cir. 1957) (finding that
assurance to take care of injured employee without specific terms is too indefinite).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1979).
51. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 434 P.2d 992,
998 (Cal. 1967).
52. See Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987); Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J.), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Thompson v. St.
Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); cf. Bankey v. Storer Broadcast-
ing Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 119 (Mich. 1989) (quoting Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892, for
the proposition that it is irrelevant whether the employee knows that the employer can
unilaterally modify its policies and practices). But see Spero v. Lockwood, Inc., 721 P.2d
174 (Idaho 1986).
53. See 1 LEX K. LARSON & PHILIP BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 8.03 (1989).
[Vol. 43
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not. 5 4 In Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell55 the Alabama Supreme
Court held that knowledge is unimportant at the time of acceptance as
long as the employee continues working after acquiring knowledge of
the term.56
The final and most important element of a unilateral contract that
must be established is consideration. In a unilateral contract the need
for a bargained-for exchange is eliminated. Acceptance of or continua-
tion of work is adequate consideration. 57 Detrimental reliance also may
serve as consideration.58 Furthermore, courts generally are reluctant to
refute employment contract claims on the ground that a lack of ade-
quate or independent consideration exists. The authorities use both
policy arguments and rules of construction to avoid examining the ade-
quacy or independence of consideration.6
IV. THE EMPLOYER'S ABILITY TO CONTROL THE TERMS OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
After it is determined that the employer is bound, the question of
whether the employer is limited in its ability to modify existing policy.
remains.6 In Toth v. Square D Co.s2 the United States District Court
54. See Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1268 n.10.
55. 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987).
56. See id. at 737.
57. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
58. Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444-45 (N.Y. 1982).
59. The Small I court also refused to inquire into the mutuality of obligations
under the employment contract. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
60. Compare WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEACH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINA-
TION RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 45 (1985) (noting that there is a general policy of not ques-
tioning the adequacy of consideration when intent to create an agreement is established)
with Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 119 (Mich. 1989) ("The benefit
to the employer of promoting [a collectively productive] environment, rather than the
traditional contract-forming mechanisms of mutual assent or individual detrimental reli-
ance, gives rise to a situation 'instinct with an obligation.' ").
However, some courts may require independent consideration to rebut the presump-
tion of at-will employment. See Gries v. Zimmer, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D.N.C.
1989) (applying Indiana law); Murray Tabb, Employee Innocence and the Privileges of
Power: Reappraisal of Implied Contract Rights, 52 Mo. L. REV. 803, 815-16 (1987). In
jurisdictions in which this requirement is recognized, the employee's performance of the
duties imposed by the employment contract is not independent consideration. See id. at
816. The requirement of independent consideration serves an evidentiary function and is
not inconsistent with the rule that the courts will not inquire into the adequacy of con-
sideration. See id. at 816-17. However, several courts have taken the view that an inquiry
into the independence of consideration is unnecessary because the same consideration
can bind multiple promises. Id. at 816; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 80
cmt. a (1979).
61. See generally Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation, Sufficiency of Notice of Modifi-
1992]
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for the District of South Carolina indicated that once bound it would
be difficult for employers to unilaterally change provisions in their pol-
icies. The court rejected the employer's assertion that revisions to its
handbook limited or eliminated the plaintiff's claim under Small L
The court stated: "The principles set forth in Small require that the
Court reject the [employer's claim]. If an employer were permitted to
extinguish an employee's rights under an existing handbook through
the simple expedient of a revised handbook, employees could suffer the
very inequities the Small court sought to prevent.""3 The court further
reasoned that unilateral modification is "contrary to established princi-
ples of contract formation"'1 and that "[o]nce the contract has been
created, the employer is legally bound by the terms of its promise
which are enforceable by the employee."6' 5
The Small I court noted that once a policy is promulgated, an em-
ployer may not treat it as illusory.66 A vast difference exists, however,
between prohibiting an employer from treating its policies as illusory
and limiting an employer's ability to alter its policies. As the Michigan
Supreme Court has stated: "It is one thing to expect that a discharge-
for-cause policy will be uniformly applied while it is in effect; it is quite
a different proposition to expect that such a personnel policy, having
no fixed duration, will be immutable unless the right to revoke the pol-
icy was expressly reserved.16 7 The Michigan Supreme Court recently
held that the employer need not explicitly reserve the right to modify
its policies, but that in order to change a policy, the employer must
uniformly give reasonable notice of the change.6 8
cation in Terms of Compensation of At-Will Employee Who Continues Performance to
Bind Employee, 69 A.L.R.4TH 1145 (1989).
62. 712 F. Supp. 1231 (D.S.C. 1989). The Toth cases challenged the employer's lay-
off policy as a breach of the employer's handbook. The suit was brought by a number of
employees who lost their jobs in the reduction. Id. at 1233.
63. Id. at 1235. In Adams v. Square D Co., 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1364
(D.S.C. 1991), Judge Anderson subsequently rejected this view. See infra note 71 and
accompanying text.
64. Toth, 712 F. Supp. at 1235.
65. Id. (citing Small I, 292 S.C. 481, 484, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987)).
66. Small I, 292 S.C. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 454 (quoting Toussaint v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Mich. 1980)).
67. Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 443 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Mich. 1989) (relying
on Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980)).
68. Id.; see also Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 734-35 (Ala.
1987) (reaching a similar result). Even the reasonable expectations approach of Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980), will not prevent an
employer from modifying policies or terms and conditions of employment. The Michigan
Supreme Court recently affirmed an employer's unilateral modification of a commission
rate, stating:
[P]olicy considerations weigh in favor of containing Toussaint to the wrongful-
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Although South Carolina appellate courts have not yet defined the
parameters of an employer's right to unilaterally modify the terms and
conditions of employment, two South Carolina trial courts have, how-
ever, indicated that they will employ a similarly lenient rule for deter-
mining when employers may modify contract terms.
69
In Adams v. Square D Co.7 0 Judge Anderson of the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina examined these two
South Carolina trial court decisions, rejected Judge Henderson's earlier
view in Toth v. Square D Co. on employer modifications, and required
only that an employer provide reasonable notice of the change.
7'
Therefore, a divergence of views exists at the federal district court
level between Judge Henderson's narrow approach in Toth, and Judge
Anderson's more liberal approach in Adams. Although there are no
state appellate court decisions on the subject, it is likely that the state
appellate courts will adopt the Adams approach because it is best sup-
ported by the leading authorities and by two well-reasoned state trial
court opinions.
Other courts are more explicit in defining the requirements for the
modification of employer policies.72 Generally, as long as employees are
discharge scenario. Were we to extend the legitimate-expectations claim to
every area governed by company policy, then each time a policy change took
place contract rights would be called into question. The fear of courting litiga-
tion would result in a substantial impairment of a company's operations and
its ability to formulate policy.
Dumas v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1249, 1251 (Mich. 1991)
(plurality).
69. See Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA)
1453, 1457 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Dorchester 1989) ("[Tlhe employees' [sic] returning to work the
next day constitutes his acceptance of and consideration for the employer's modification
of existing policies.") (citing Brookshaw v. South St. Paul Feed, Inc., 381 N.W.2d 33, 36
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986)); see also Blankenship v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 5 Indiv.
Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 930, 932 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Richland 1990) (following the Allan
court's view).
70. 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1364 (D.S.C. 1991).
71. Id. at 1366-67 (citing Blankenship, 5 Indiv' Empl. Rts. Cas. at 932; Allan, 4
Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. at 1457).
72. See Thompson v. Kings Entertainment Co., 674 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (E.D. Va.
1987) (mem.) (stating that although there is no strict prohibition against modifying ex-
isting policies, employees must understand the change and continue to work under the
new terms before the new policy is binding) (citing Thompson v. American Motor Inns,
Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409, 416-17 (W.D. Va. 1985) (mem.)); National Rifle Ass'n v. Ailes, 428
A.2d 816, 822 (D.C. 1981) (holding that unless an employee expressly agrees to be bound
by a change in policy, "the employer must prove that the employee's knowledge of the
change was complete enough for the trier of fact to find ... that the employee's decision
to remain on the job was premised on acceptance of the new policy"); Hathaway v. Gen-
eral Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986) (requiring both specific and unequivocal
notice of the change and acceptance of the change by continuation of employment) (cit-
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given reasonable and uniform notice of the change in terms, the em-
ployer will be free to alter the terms and conditions of employment.
However, the question of what role disclaimers will play in this analy-
sis remains.
7 3
The Small I court also noted that an employer could prevent a
policy statement from becoming binding at all, thereby eliminating the
concern that a future modification would be effective. The court stated:
If an employer wishes to issue policies, manuals, or bulletins as
purely advisory statements with no intent of being bound by them
and with a desire to continue under the employment at will policy, he
certainly is free to do so. This could be accomplished merely by in-
serting a conspicuous disclaimer or provision into the written
document.
74
Often courts use effective disclaimers as support for denying re-
lief.75 This is especially true under the outward manifestations ap-
proach when the asserted term is couched in nonmandatory language.
Whether a disclaimer is effective often turns on the interrelated ele-
ments of potency, context, and distinction.
The degree of potency of the disclaimer is established by balanc-
ing the purported disclaimer against the alleged contract term. If the
alleged term or provision is specific and in writing, courts examine the
disclaimer more closely. In Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
76
the court examined two express disclaimers.17 The court used the dis-
claimers to deny the enforcement of the employer's "'operating philos-
ing L.G. Balfour Co. v. Brown, 110 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)).
73. See generally Michael A. Chagares, Utilization of the Disclaimer as an Effec-
tive Means to Define the Employment Relationship, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 365 (1989).
74, Small I, 292 S.C. 481, 485, 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1987). It is unclear whether
there is any substantive meaning to the Small I court's reference to "or provision" after
the word "disclaimer." None of the cases from other jurisdictions deal with the renuncia-
tion of any rights outside of the disclaimer context. The Michigan Supreme Court has
held, however, that a clear disclaimer limits an employee's ability to rely on the reasona-
ble expectations theory of enforcement. See Rowe v. Montgomery Ward, & Indiv. Empl.
Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1185, 1192 (Mich. 1991) (plurality).
75. For a complete list of South Carolina cases in which courts have granted sum-
mary judgment or a directed verdict by pointing to the disclaimer in the employer's
handbook, see infra note 102.
76.4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Dorchester 1989).
77. The first disclaimer stated: "FURTHER, I UNDERSTAND AND AGREE
THAT MY EMPLOYMENT IS FOR NO DEFINITE PERIOD AND MAY, REGARD-
LESS OF THE DATE OF PAYMENT OF MY WAGES AND SALARY, BE TERMI-
NATED AT ANY TIME WITHOUT PREVIOUS NOTICE." Id. at 1454. The second
disclaimer stated: "These policies are NOT a contract of employment. The provisions of
our personnel policies are subject to change at any time . . . . Notwithstanding any of
the provisions of any personnel policy, all employees ... are 'employees-at-will' . . ."
[Vol. 43
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ophy... that each employee be treated with individual dignity"' and
its principles "'[that employees shall be promoted on the basis of
demonstrated ability and loyalty [and] [t]hat the Company will try in-
sofar as possible to provide permanent, steady work to all employees
subject to its normal business conditions.' "178
In discussing the clear wording of the disclaimers and the em-
ployer's policy statement, the court impliedly employed a balancing
test."' The Arizona Supreme Court has previously described the test as
resting on an interpretation of the manual as a whole in addition to an
examination of the parties' statements and actions.8 0 When an alleged
term is stronger or more concretely set out, the court is more likely to
deny summary judgment for the employer and submit the issue to the
jury.
8 1
Courts also consider the context of a disclaimer. The Small I court
declared that a disclaimer may become effective by inserting it into the
written document."2 This declaration implies that any disclaimer of a
written provision must itself be in writing. This implication raises
questions about the practical effect of placing the disclaimer in various
documents.
8 3
The Allan court noted that the first disclaimer 4 was placed di-
rectly over the signature line on the employment application s.8  The
court found this, along with the second disclaimer, to be persuasive
evidence of a lack of intent on the part of the employer to form a
contract.8 "
What if the only disclaimer was the one contained in the applica-
tion? This issue arose in Stone v. Mission Bay Mortgage Co.,8 7 in
78. Id. (quoting handbook).
79. But cf. Ballenger v. Jackson Mills, Inc., 7 indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 126
(S.C. Ct. C.P. Spartanburg 1991) (holding that a clear disclaimer discharged the em-
ployer's obligation to fire only in accordance with its absence policy).
80. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1037-38 (Ariz. 1985)
(en banc).
81. See id. But cf. Ballenger v. Jackson Mills, Inc., 7 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA)
126 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Spartanburg 1991) (denying relief notwithstanding a policy on dis-
charge when the disclaimer was conspicuous).
82. Small I, 292 S.C. 481, 485, 357 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1987).
83. In Johnson v. First Carolina Financial Corp., 409 S.E.2d 804 (S.C. Ct. App.
1991), the court noted that the employee's failure to sign a disclaimer in an employment
manual was irrelevant because the employee asserted that the manual was part of the
employment contract. Id. at 805 & n.1 (citing Peddler, Inc. v. Rikard, 266 S.C. 28, 221
S.E.2d 115 (1975)).
84. See supra note 77.
85. Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453,
1454 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Dorchester 1989).
86. Id. at 1457.
87. 672 P.2d 629 (Nev. 1983) (per curiam).
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which the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that a material issue of fact
existed about whether the applicant intended the completion of the
application, including a signature immediately below the disclaimer, to
be anything more than informational." The court remanded the case
on the issue of intent of the'employee to contract under the dis-
claimer.89 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia also held
that a disclaimer in an employment application was effective even
though it was not reinforced in subsequent documents.9 0 In dicta the
court "recognize[d], however, that a disclaimer may lose its effective-
ness due to changed circumstances" and stated:
[I]f an employee signed an employment application containing a valid
disclaimer, but ten years later the employer issued an employee hand-
book containing definite promises of job security, the handbook could
supersede the employment application and form the basis of a new
agreement. Hence, the wisest course for an employer ... would be to
place a ... disclaimer in the employee handbook. 1
It is therefore unclear whether a disclaimer in the application adds
anything to the analysis.
In determining whether a disclaimer is distinct, the more fre-
quently litigated issue is the role of the disclaimer within the policy
manual. Within the handbook two issues of primary importance exist.
First, as to notice, is the disclaimer "conspicuous?" Second, as to effec-
tiveness, is the disclaimer specific enough itself to warrant
enforcement?
Since Small I the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina has addressed the conspicuousness issue twice. In Net-
tles v. Techplan Corp.9 2 the district court borrowed from the Uniform
Commercial Code's definition of the term -conspicuous" and stated
that the standard was comprised of three elements: The type size, the
print color, and the location. Although the disclaimer was neither set
in a different type nor in a different color from the rest of the hand-
book, the court held that the disclaimer was sufficiently conspicuous.9 5
In reaching its decision the court gave great weight to the fact that the
disclaimer was located in a separate paragraph on the first page of the
88. Id. at 630.
89. Id. (citing Smith v. Recrion Corp., 541 P.2d 663 (Nev. 1975)).
90. Suter v. Harsco Corp., 403 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 1991).
91. Id. at 755.
92. 704 F. Supp. 95 (D.S.C. 1988).
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(10) (Law. Co-op. 1976) ("A term or clause is conspic-
uous when it is so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought
to have noticed it.").








In Prezzy v. Food Lion Inc.9 7 the court relied heavily on Nettles.
In Prezzy the disclaimer also was set out in a separate paragraph on
the first page of the handbook. The court ruled that the disclaimer was
"sufficiently conspicuous that a reasonable reader of the handbook
would have noticed it."9 Because placement is an extremely important
factor when determining whether a disclaimer is conspicuous, it could
be said that the standard is almost one of prominence rather than
conspicuousness.99
The issue of specificity relates to the disclaimer's clarity 00 or con-
creteness. 011 A finding that the clause is potent is not sufficient to es-
tablish that a disclaimer is effective. An employer also must establish
that the disclaimer is both conspicuous and specific enough to be oper-
ative. Because no South Carolina case has independently addressed
specificity, employers should consider the disclaimers in the cases that
have been decided to date.102
96. Id.
97. 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 996 (D.S.C. 1989).
98. Id. at 997.
99. See Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J.), modified,
499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); see also Chagares, supra note 73, at 385-86 (noting that courts
have held that disclaimers are conspicuous when placed on the front page, the inside
cover page, the second page, or on the last page).
100. See Woolley, 491 A.2d at 1269.
101. See Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 461 (6th Cir. 1986).
102. Adams v. Square D Co., 6 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1364 (D.S.C. 1991);
Prezzy v. Food Lion, Inc., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 996 (D.S.C. 1989); Nettles v.
Techplan Corp., 704 F. Supp. 95 (D.S.C. 1988); Johnson v. First Carolina Fin. Corp., 409
S.E.2d 804 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991); Lamond v. City of Myrtle Beach, 7 Indiv. Empl. Rts.
Cas. (BNA) 128 (S.C. Ct. C.P. 1991); Ballenger v. Jackson Mills, Inc., 7 Indiv. Empl. Rts.
Cas. (BNA) 126 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Spartanburg 1991); Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Dorchester 1989). The court in
Blankenship v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 5 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 930
(S.C. Ct. C.P. Richland 1990), granted summary judgment to the employer based in part
on the existence of a handbook disclaimer. The court did not, however, reproduce the
language of the disclaimer in its opinion.
There also are divergent views on the effectiveness of disclaimers. Compare Stinson
v. American Sterilizer Co., 570 So. 2d 618 (Ala. 1990) (affirming grant of summary judg-
ment when the disclaimer was not conspicuous but the asserted term reserved discretion
to the employer) with Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1987) (reversing the
trial court's grant of summary judgment to the employer because the disclaimer ap-
peared only in a supervisor's manual and may not have been published to the employ-
ees); Stone v. Mission Bay Mortgage Co., 672 P.2d 629 (Nev. 1983) (per curiam) (revers-
ing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the employer because the disclaimer
appeared only above the signature line on the employment application and because
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V. CAUSATION AND REMEDIES
Employers who breach employment contracts occasionally attempt
to draw distinctions between substantive and procedural breaches and
argue that they can rightfully fire the employee despite a procedural
breach of contract. This argument assumes that the employer would
have fired the plaintiff even if it had followed the procedures. However,
the causation argument does not always fare well, especially when the
employer has breached a progressive discipline scheme. Small I illus-
trates this result. In Small I the employer breached the contract by
failing to adhere to a progressive discipline schedule. The court found
that the employer denied Small a contractual right to warnings prior to
discharge.103
Some courts recognize a substantive right to the warnings in a pro-
gressive discipline scheme. In Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche °"' the em-
ployer argued that it should be allowed to show that the plaintiff
would have been fired even if the company had complied with its pro-
cedures. The New Jersey Supreme Court disagreed. "If the court or
jury concludes that the manual's job security provisions are binding,
then, according to those provisions, even if good cause existed, an em-
ployee could not be fired unless the employer went through the various
procedures set forth in the manual, steps designed to rehabilitate that
employee in order to avoid termination."' 05 Some courts justify this
result by implying that when procedures exist, employers can termi-
nate employees only for cause.106
An employer's causation argument is more effective if the plain-
tiff's culpability is unquestioned. In Kohler v. Ericsson, Inc.17 the
plaintiff admitted her performance was unsatisfactory. The employer
failed, however, to administer performance evaluations as outlined in
its policies. In holding for the employer, the court drew an analogy be-
103. Small I, 292 S.C. 481, 357 SE.2d 452 (1987).
104, 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J.), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985).
105. Id. at 1270; accord Thompson v. American Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409,
416 (W.D. Va. 1985) (mem.). But see Shah v. General Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 946 (W.D.
Ky. 1988) ("[Discharge procedure] guidelines, in the absence of a fixed term of employ-
ment, or express contractual promises on the part of the employee and the employer,
cannot modify or prove an exception to the 'employment at will doctrine.' "). Although
the Woolley court refused to consider the employer's argument in determining, on a
summary judgment motion, whether Woolley was an at-will employee, it held that the
employer could present its arguments at trial on the merits of the discharge only if it
prevailed on the issue of procedural compliance. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.,
499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (order on motion for clarification).
106. See, e.g., Arnold v. B.J. Titan Servs. Co., 783 P.2d 541, 544 (Utah 1989) (per
curiam).
107. 847 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1988).
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tween the plaintiff's claim and the causation element of a cause of ac-
tion in tort law. "[T]he breach resulting from [the employer's] failure
would need to be sufficiently material to excuse [the employee's] fail-
ure to perform satisfactorily."' 8
Small v. Springs Industries, Inc.'08 (Small I1) is one of few cases
that has addressed the issue of the appropriate measure of damages in
an employment contract case."' Generally, a wrongfully discharged
employee suing for breach of contract is entitled to recover the amount
of net loss caused by the employer's breach."' Damages may be "mea-
sured by (1) the plaintiffs reasonable expectations, (2) the plaintiffs
reliance upon the promises or conduct of the defendant, or (3) the ben-
efits conferred by the plaintiff upon the defendant." 2 Damages may
include the value of unused leave, vacation pay, and other fringe bene-
fits including pensions and promised bonuses." 3
Equitable remedies in employment cases include reinstatement
and injunctions and are typically disfavored by the courts." 4 The cases
usually find an absence of irreparable injury because contractual dam-
ages provide appropriate relief.V 5
108. Id. at 502. The Kohler court's materiality standard may be an attempt to dis-
tinguish a procedural breach from a substantive breach. The court in Salanger v. U.S.
Air, 611 F. Supp. 427 (N.D.N.Y. 1985) (mem.), distinguished substantive breaches from
procedural breaches and noted the absence of any express for-cause language in the de-
fendant company's policies. The court also found that "[w]hile the Personnel Policy
Guides and grievance procedures did provide a forum to appeal termination for cause
decisions, no language in any corporate document limited defendant's authority to dis-
charge for any reason." Id. at 431. In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished
Weiner v. McGraw-Hill' Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982), as a case in which there was
an express for-cause provision. Salanger, 611 F. Supp. at 431. The Salanger court stated
that Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983), modified
Weiner when it held that "contractual provisions limiting the employer's right to termi-
nate may not be implied in an employment agreement." Salanger, 611 F. Supp. at 431
(citing Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 91).
109. 300 S.C. 481, 388 S.E.2d 808 (1990).
110. Steven M. Wynkoop & Elizabeth Scott Moise, Employee Handbooks in South
Carolina: The Employers' Dilemma, 42 S.C. L. REv. 323, 336 (1991).
111. Small II, 300 S.C. at 484, 388 S.E.2d at 810 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 455 (1958); 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 1358 (3d ed. 1968)).
112. HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 60, at 397-98.
113. Id. at 404-05.
114. See Kurle v. Evangelical Hosp. Ass'n, 411 N.E.2d 326, 331-32 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980). But cf. Brockmeyer v. Dunn & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983)
("[R]einstatement and backpay are the most appropriate remedies for public policy ex-
ception wrongful discharges . . .
115. See, e.g., Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114, 116 (Minn. 1981)
(stating that the court will limit recovery to reliance damages). For a forceful and elo-
quent argument that monetary damages do not provide an adequate remedy, see Samp-
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South Carolina Code section 41-1-70 limits recovery of employees
fired for honoring subpoenas. 116 The statute does not extend to other
public policy cases or to Small causes of action. The statute may pro-
vide, however, a good public policy argument about the appropriate
limitation of damages. The legislature has not directly responded to
either Small opinion.
Small II concerned an employee's duty to mitigate damages and
whether the plaintiff's damages should be tolled by her refusal to ac-
cept an unconditional offer of re-employment. 1 1 The Small II court
gave a detailed framework for applying the doctrine of avoidable con-
sequences."18 Initially, the employer must prove that it made an offer
for re-employment that was bona fide on its face." 9 To qualify as a
bona fide offer, the offer must reinstate the employee to the same or a
substantially similar position at the same pay.2 ' The offer must not
require that the employee waive a legal right to pursue a cause of
action.' 2 1
Once the employer presents sufficient evidence of a bona fide offer,
the burden shifts to the employee to show that the offer was not made
in good faith or that the refusal of the offer was reasonable.
2 2 If
"something has occurred to render further association between the par-
ties offensive or degrading to the employee," then the employee's re-
fusal of the offer would be reasonable.
2 3
If damages are not tolled by an offer of re-employment, the court
then turns to the issue of future damages. Damages cannot be specula-
tive.124 The Small I1 court did not address the anomalous result that a
court may determine "the duration of continued employment" in a
contract that is, by law, indefinite in duration. Nonetheless, unless evi-
son v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 95 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting), quoted in HOLLOWAY &
LEECH, supra note 60, at 413-14.
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-70 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990). Damages are limited to one
year of salary or fifty-two weeks of wages. Id.
117. See Small II, 300 S.C. 481, 484-85, 388 S.E.2d 808, 810-11 (1990). For a de-
tailed discussion of Small II, see Stephen Coe, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law,
Supreme Court Discusses Damages for Breach of Contract Based on Employee Hand-
book, 43 S.C. L. REV. 80 (1991).
118. Small II, 300 S.C. at 484-87, 388 S.E.2d at 810-11; see Coe, supra note 117, at
82-83; see generally HOLLOWAY & LEACH, supra note 60, at 407-09; William H. Danne,
Jr., Annotation, Nature of Alternative Employment Which Employee Must Accept to
Minimize Damages for Wrongful Discharge, 44 A.L.R.3D 629 (1986).
119. Small II, 300 S.C. at 485, 388 S.E.2d at 811.
120. Id. (citing Flickema v. Henry Kraker Co., 233 N.W. 362 (Mich. 1930)).
121. Id. (citing University of Alaska v. Chauvin, 521 P.2d 1234 (Alaska 1974)).
122. Id. at 486, 388 S.E.2d at 811.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 488, 388 S.E.2d at 812.
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dence exists that another causal factor would have terminated the rela-
tionship, a determination of future damages clearly would be specula-
tive and inherently inconsistent with Small II.
VI. PROCEDURAL CONCERNS
When may a South Carolina court dispose of an employee's Small
I claim without submitting it to the jury? The answer is not entirely
clear. In Small I the court stated:
Under the common law, a trial court should submit to the jury the
issue of existence of a contract when its existence is questioned and
the evidence is either conflicting or admits of more than one inference.
It was for the jury to decide whether the handbook, the bulletin, and
the oral assurances constituted an employment contract.
125
However, in Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co." 6 Judge Brown
granted the employer's motion for a directed verdict. The handbook in
Allan contained an express disclaimer and did not establish a progres-
sive discipline scheme or provide that employees would be terminated
only for cause. Judge Brown distinguished the handbook in Small I,
which contained a four-step discipline scheme.'27
The court found that the handbook did not alter Allan's at-will
status. Judge Brown stated that "the evidence is not sufficient to sub-
mit the case to the jury [because] [n]o controverted issue of material
fact exists on which reasonable persons could differ." 18 Therefore, it is
unclear whether South Carolina courts will follow the Small I stan-
dard, which requires that the evidence be submitted to the jury if the
125. 292 S.C. 481, 483, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454 (1987) (citation omitted). The New
Jersey Supreme Court takes a different view. In Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.,
491 A.2d 1257 (N.J.), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985), the court held that the issue of
the existence or applicability of an employment contract is submitted to the jury only "if
reasonable men could differ," id. at 1270, and noted that the court could make all of the
necessary determinations in the case, id. at 1270 n.13.
126. 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Dorchester 1989).
127. Id. at 1455-56. Even when there is a definitive scheme, the existence of an ef-
fective disclaimer probably will provide adequate grounds for summary judgment. Bal-
lenger v. Jackson Mills, Inc., 7 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 126 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Spartan-
burg 1991). For a list of cases under South Carolina law in which courts have granted
summary judgment or a directed verdict on the basis of the employer's disclaimer, see
supra note 102.
128. Allan, 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. at 1457; cf. Johnson v. First Carolina Fin. Corp.,
409 S.E.2d 804 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment for the employer on the basis of handbook disclaimers despite a factual dispute
about the reasons for the employee's termination). Judge Brown's view is similar to the
Woolley standard. See supra note 125.
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evidence "is conflicting or admits of more than one inference, ' 129 or the
Allan standard, which requires that the evidence be submitted to the
jury only when an "issue of material fact exists on which reasonable
persons could differ."13 0
South Carolina courts also may determine that summary judgment
is appropriate in cases in which the sole question is whether an em-
ployer's disclaimer is effective. In such cases the court may determine
as a matter of law that the disclaimer is sufficiently "conspicuous" as
required by Small 1 1 31 and grant summary judgment for the
employer.131
VII. COMING TRENDS IN LAW AND EQUITY: THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AND ESTOPPEL
The Small I court's reliance on contract theory arguably opens the
door for courts to apply other contract-based doctrines such as implied
covenants of good faith and fair dealing and promissory estoppel.3 s If
courts use these doctrines, employers would be exposed to greater lia-
bility, and employees could recover on a greater scope of employer
acts.
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is theoretically implied
into every contract. 134 In an action for breach of a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff does not bear the burden of proving
the covenant's existence. The covenant is implied at law, and the judge
determines whether it exists. The jury then determines whether the
employer breached it. Unlike implied-in-fact terms, the covenant may
129. Small I, 292 S.C. at 483, 357 S.E.2d at 454.
130. Allan, 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. at 1457. It appears, however, that when the
employer does not make a representation, the courts will not allow an inferential ques-
tion of fact to go to the jury. See Epps v. Clarendon County, 405 S.E.2d 386 (S.C. 1991)
(per curiam); Reitmeier v. Converse College, 7 Indiv. EmpI. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 137 (S.C.
Ct. C.P. 1991). For a list of cases under South Carolina law in which courts have granted
summary judgment or a directed verdict on the basis of the employer's disclaimer, see
supra note 102.
131. See Small I, 292 S.C. at 485, 357 S.E.2d at 455.
132. Ballenger v. Jackson Mills, Inc., 7 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 126 (S.C. Ct.
C.P. Spartanburg 1991). The United States District Court for the District of South Caro-
lina also has adopted this view. See Nettles v. Techplan Corp., 704 F. Supp. 95 (D.S.C.
1988); see also Prezzy v. Food Lion Inc., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 996 (D.S.C.
1989) (finding that a reasonable reader would notice the disclaimer and it therefore was
conspicuous). For a complete list of cases under South Carolina law in which the court
granted summary judgment or a directed verdict on the basis of a written disclaimer, see
supra note 102.
133, For a list of the jurisdictions that have accepted or rejected the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, see LARSON & BOROWSKY, supra note 53, § 3.05[2].
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979).
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Recognition of the covenant would be entirely consistent with the
theory of Small L The covenant would not create a new cause of ac-
tion; its recognition would merely create a new remedy to vindicate
existing contract rights."36 A conceptual gap exists, however, between
Small I and the recognition of implied-at-law covenants. The Small I
court carefully limited exposure to representations couched in
mandatory terms. It may be inferred that the court was reluctant to
imply any obligations, in fact or at law, beyond express
representations.
The United States District Court for the District of South Caro-
lina has twice considered and rejected the covenant."37 However, given
the particulars of each case, there is good cause to believe that the
appellate courts of South Carolina may accept the covenant.
In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co."5s the federal dis-
trict court considered the covenant for the first time and rejected it."39
In Satterfield the plaintiffs alleged breach of the covenant in an em-
ployment-at-will contract. The court stated that the law of employ-
ment-at-will "is antithetical to the concept of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing."' 140 Satterfield was decided two years
before Small L If a Small I plaintiff successfully overcomes the pre-
sumption of employment-at-will, Satterfield would be inapplicable be-
cause its premise would no longer apply.
After Small I the federal district court in Nettles v. Techplan
Corp."' granted summary judgment for the employer on the plaintiff's
breach of the covenant claim. In Nettles, however, the court rejected
the covenant claim only after finding as a matter of law that the plain-
tiff did not rebut the at-will presumption.' 4" Nettles does not explicitly
reject the existence of the covenant; it ruled against the employee be-
cause there was no contract that modified the at-will relationship into
135. Stark v. Circle K Corp., 751 P.2d 162, 166 (Mont. 1988); Tabb, supra note 60,
at 811.
136. The covenant of good faith and fair dealing already exists in South Carolina in
the commercial context. Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts.
Cas. (BNA) 1453, 1455 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Dorchester 1989) (citing Tharpe v. G.E. Moore Co.,
254 S.C. 196, 174 S.E.2d 397 (1970); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson Motors, Inc., 247
S.C. 360, 147 S.E.2d 481 (1966)).
137. Nettles v. Techplan Corp., 704 F. Supp. 95, 98 (D.S.C. 1988); Satterfield v.
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-65 (D.S.C. 1985).
138. 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985).
139. Id. at 1363-65.
140. Id. at 1364 (relying on Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86
(N.Y. 1983)).
141. 704 F. Supp. 95 (D.S.C. 1988).
142. Id. at 98.
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which the covenant could be implied. 143
Finally, Judge Brown of the South Carolina Court of Common
Pleas stated in Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co.'4 that South
Carolina has not recognized a separate cause of action for a breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment-at-
will contracts.'" The Allan court employed a rationale similar to Net-
tles and found that because the plaintiff did not prove that a contract
which altered the at-will relationship existed, no covenant could be im-
plied and no breach occurred.1
46
Although it appears from the above cases that a cause of action for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is precluded
under South Carolina law, this is not necessarily true. If a Small I
plaintiff can establish the existence of an express or implied-in-fact
contractual obligation that modifies the at-will relationship, the courts
may be willing to imply a covenant.
If South Carolina courts were to imply a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing into employment contracts, several issues arise. First,
would an action for breach be grounded in tort or contract? Second,
what would the covenant mean in the employment context? Third,
what would it add to the Small analysis in terms of actionable conduct
by the employer?
If the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is recognized in
South Carolina, the courts would likely view it in contract rather than
tort.147 Recognition in contract is consistent with the "no new cause of
143. Id.
144. 4 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 1453 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Dorchester 1989).
145. Id. at 1455.
146. Id. The plaintiff in Allan was discharged pursuant to a specific handbook
provision.
147. The Allan court did not state whether it viewed the cause of action as one in
tort or contract. The court's reliance on Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co.,
617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985), as well as its reference to commercial contracts, strongly
suggests that the Allan court viewed the cause of action as one in contract. The leading
case that supports this view is Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389-96 (Cal.
1988) (en banc). Foley is very important because California was the first state to find.
that the cause of action was in tort. See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr.
722 (Ct. App. 1980), overruled by Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 395 (Cal.
1988) (en banc). But cf. Carter v. Catamore Co., 571 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. I1. 1983)
(stating that the duty of good faith and fair dealing sounds in both tort and contract,
and punitive damages therefore may be awarded for a breach); Dare v. Montana Petro-
leum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984) (holding that the existence of an employ-
ment handbook is not required for a court to imply a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (Nev. 1987) (finding that in excep-
tional circumstances a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing can give rise
to the tort of bad faith discharge and affirming the jury's award of punitive damages in
addition to contract damages).
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action" rationale of Toth v. Square D Co. 4"
The meaning of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
employment context may present some interesting interpretational
problems. The Uniform Commercial Code's definitions of good faith
and fair dealing are inapplicable to the employment relationship. Sec-
tion 1-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code uses the phrase "honesty
in fact.' 149 This definition is not useful if honesty is not at issue. Sec-
tion 2-103 uses the phrase "reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing."'' 50 The use of such an objective standard, however, may lead
to a reliance on the closest standardized body of employment law and
doctrine-collective bargaining. Although the law of collective bargain-
ing is not inherently offensive, imposing its standards on an employer
in the unilateral contract context offends well-established principles of
contract law.' 5'
Professor Corbin's approach to the definition of the covenant is
more useful in the employment context. He defines the concept of good
faith and fair dealing as, "[t]he obligation to preserve the spirit of the
bargain rather than the letter, the adherence to substance rather than
form." 52 Corbin's definition effectively incorporates the parties' intent
and is intuitively simple:
The spirit of the bargain usually contemplates that a contracting
party shall not try to deprive the other of the consideration for which
he bargained . . . . Besides forbidding attempts to prevent the other
party from getting the consideration for which he bargained ... this
principle of justice forbids attempts by the actor to get more for him-
self than the other party reasonably contemplated giving him at the
time the contractual relationship was entered into, absent good cause.
Either kind of motive to evade the spirit of the bargain is condemned
'53
Corbin's reasoning is based on equitable considerations and should
lead to predictable results for both parties.15
148. 298 S.C. 6, 377 S.E.2d 584 (1989) (per curiam).
149. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1-201(19) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
150. Id. § 36-2-103(l)(b).
151. "[A] law Court sits to ascertain the rights of the parties, according as they have
fixed them: it has no power to declare what, in good conscience, they ought to be, and to
compel the parties to accordingly acknowledge, and allow them to have effect." Baynard
v. Eddings, 33 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 374, 377 (1848).
152. 3A CORBIN, supra note 40, § 654a(A) (citations omitted).
153. 3A id. § 654e(A).
154. The court in Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987),
adopted Corbin's rationale. Campbell involved an express contract for certain terms of
employment. These express terms altered the employment-at-will status. However, the
employment was otherwise terminable at-will.
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If recognized, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be
invaluable for plaintiffs because it limits the employer's ability to af-
fect an employee's tenure. The covenant places tenure beyond the ex-
clusive control of the employer.155 This tenure-limiting effect is logical
when viewed in light of the facts of Small L In Small I the employee
sued the employer for failure to follow the promulgated discharge pro-
cedure. Because the discharge would violate the covenant, the bad
faith failure to accord the plaintiff due process would itself be actiona-
ble. Therefore, a plaintiff may be able to attain desired results even if a
breach of an express or implied-in-fact term does not exist.156
Additionally, the covenant widens the spectrum of employer activ-
ity upon which the employee could bring an action. The facts of Hoff-
man-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell157 illustrate this point. The plaintiff,
an award-winning pharmaceutical salesman, was unable to work on a
full time basis because of his deteriorating health. Nonetheless, his su-
pervisors encouraged him to continue working and to keep them ap-
prised. The employee handbook explicitly reserved management's right
to discharge for failure to perform if it considered the salesperson una-
ble to meet the requirements of the job. The plaintiff was discharged
under this section of the handbook. The court did not specifically ad-
dress other language in the handbook in reaching the covenant issue. 158
The Campbell court implied the covenant and affirmed the jury award
for the plaintiff employee. 59 If the court had not imposed a duty of
good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff in Campbell would not have
recovered because the employer did not violate any express contract
right. 60
The Small I court's analysis also may result in the South Carolina
courts' application of promissory estoppel in the employment context.
Promissory estoppel is an equitable method by which a court can make
a promise binding when a contract has not been formed.' 6 ' "[T]he doc-
155. See PEnRRT, supra note 3, § 4.11, at 191.
156. Small II, 300 S.C. 481, 388 S.E.2d 808 (1990).
157. 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987).
158. The handbook contained a clause which stated that the policies would be "ap-
plied fairly." The court avoided this clause for the purpose of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing analysis. The court later noted in dicta that "[e]ven if such an obligation
of good faith and fair dealing was not necessarily implied by law. . . the language of the
handbook expressly stated that the policies . . . would be 'applied fairly.'" Id. at 739.
159. Id. at 738-39.
160. The covenant is often used as a catch-all "'safety" valve to which judges may
turn to fill gaps and qualify or limit rights and duties otherwise arising under rules of law
and specific contract language.'" Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389 (Cal.
1988) (en banc) (quoting Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith-Its
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 812 (1982)).
161, 28 Am. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 48 (1966); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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trine of promissory estoppel . . . has the consequence that principles
of estoppel may be applied to one making a promise or assurance con-
cerning the future .. ". ."I" Promissory estoppel applies if the em-
ployer intended the promise to be relied upon, the employee relied
upon it, and the court's refusal to enforce the promise would be
unjust. 6 '
Promissory estoppel would be appropriate in cases in which the
employer promises to offer employment to an individual and that indi-
vidual detrimentally relies on the promise. In Grouse v. Group Health
Plan, Inc.16 4 the defendant offered the plaintiff a job as a pharmacist.
The plaintiff accepted the offer, quit his existing job, and declined
other offers of employment. The defendant then withdrew its offer.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota held that under promissory estoppel
the plaintiff was entitled to his reliance damages. 6 5
A different situation would arise in cases in which the plaintiff was
unemployed at the time of the employer's promise. Arguably, such a
plaintiff would suffer no detriment if the promise was revoked. How-
ever, one court has stated that there is "no rational basis for distin-
guishing [between] promises for new employment and promises for
continued job security."' 66 If this view is accepted, there would be no
basis for distinguishing between pre-employment offers to currently
employed persons and offers to unemployed persons.
The South Carolina courts have neither expressly accepted nor re-
jected the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the employment context.
Although the South Carolina Supreme Court has clarified that a Small
action is an action at law,' 6 7 an action based on equity principles still
may be viable. In Link v. School District6" the supreme court im-
pliedly recognized that a separate claim for promissory estoppel is via-
ble in a Small I case. In Link a discharged teacher brought separate
CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
162. 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 48, at 658 (1966).
163. Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 284 S.C. 81, 100, 326
S.E.2d 395, 406 (1985) (citing Higgins Constr. Co. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 276
S.C. 663, 281 S.E.2d 469 (1981)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979).
164. 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981).
165. Id. at 116. The employer argued that a promissory estoppel cause of action for
failure to hire would lead to anomalous results. The employer pointed out that a plaintiff
who had not started work would have a cause of action but an employee who worked one
day and was fired would have no recourse. The court responded by stating that a cause
of action for promissory estoppel is viable even after the plaintiff commences work. Id.
166. Morishige v. Spencecliff Corp., 720 F. Supp. 829, 836 (D. Hawaii 1989).
167. Small II, 300 S.C. 481, 487, 388 S.E.2d 808, 812 (1990); cf. Wilie v. Price, 26
S.C. Eq. (5 Rich. Eq.) 91 (1852) (dismissing a suit in equity for breach of an employment
contract and stating that if a remedy did exist, it was one at law).
168. 302 S.C. 1, 393 S.E.2d 176 (1990).
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actions for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The supreme
court held that "[p]romissory estoppel and contract are separate and
distinct causes of action. Accordingly, the. . . argument that a general
verdict on the promissory estoppel cause of action precludes the con-
tract action is without merit."'169 The court did not decide whether a
promissory estoppel action can validly be asserted in a Small I case.
However, the implied recognition of the doctrine may expand the theo-
ries of recovery available to plaintiffs and open up various avenues of
equitable relief.
The use of promissory estoppel to rebut the at-will presumption
would not contradict the underlying theory of Small . According to
the court in Toth v. Square D Co.,17 0 Small I did not intend to create a
new cause of action.1 7 1 Allowing the admission of handbooks, policies,
and oral statements as evidence in a promissory estoppel case is consis-




At first glance the rules of law set forth in the Small decisions
appear unremarkable. However, two views that would lead to much
different results exist on the theory and impact of Small L
Small I may actually be as limited as it first appears. The em-
ployer's exposure may be limited to outward manifestations of policy
that have the appearance of a binding obligation. If true, employers
have the adequate means to protect themselves by using effective dis-
claimers. If courts continue to read Small I narrowly, then very few
cases should arise.
Alternatively, the Small I court's contractual analysis can be
viewed as a springboard that may be used to imply additional contrac-
tual theories of recovery. Promissory estoppel and breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing are established causes of action in
South Carolina and would neatly fit into the Small I framework. A
close examination of activity in other jurisdictions supports this view.
The potential for increased employer exposure therefore exists.
Acceptance of promissory estoppel and breach of the covenant of
169. Id. at 7, 393 S.E.2d at 179 (citing Duke Power Co. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 284 S.C. 81, 326 S.E.2d 395 (1985)). However, the court implied that its reason-
ing was based on the employer's failure to argue that a cause of action for promissory
estoppel in the employment context does not exist.
170. 298 S.C. 6, 377 S.E.2d 584 (1989) (per curiam).
171. Id. at 9, 377 S.E.2d at 586.
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good faith and fair dealing would increase the employer's exposure to
litigation because the range of activity that a disgruntled employee
could challenge would be greatly expanded. Additionally, predictability
of outcome would be reduced because the courts would abandon estab-
lished rules of employment law. Thus, more litigation would result.
These concerns are counterbalanced, however, by the policy be-
hind Small I. The Small I court was concerned that illusory manifesta-
tions of policy would result in the increased chance of unfair surprise
for employees. The application of established contract law should pre-
vent this from occurring or at least provide employees with a remedy.
However, this same policy concern also could defeat the expansion of
recovery theories to include estoppel and implied covenants because
those outcomes are equally unpredictable.
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